Colligatory Concepts and Colligations in Integrated History and Philosophy of Science

While there is a substantial body of literature addressing methods in the history of science and the role it can play in our study of science (e.g. work of Hasok Chang, Peter Galison, Laurent Loison, Naomi Oreskes, Nick Jardine, Hakob Barseghyan), much of it remains disconnected from the broader philosophy of historiography, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. work of Quentin Skinner, Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, Katerina Kinzel… and Louis-Étienne Villeneuve). One key indicator of this gap is the absence of discussions surrounding colligations, colligatory concepts, narrative substance, and narrative explanations in the lexicon of integrated history and philosophy of science. This is particularly evident in the use of realist terminology like "historical case studies" and "historical episodes," which are often treated as mere data points to bolster claims about science, without acknowledging their colligative and narrative dimensions.

In this talk, I will bridge the gap between work in the philosophy of the historiography of science and general philosophy of historiography, showing how translating the language of one field into the other significantly alters the kinds of questions we ask and inquiry we do. To illustrate this, I will explore three examples: debates surrounding colligatory concepts such as "scientific revolutions", methodological issue of cherry-picking, and issues of presentism. From these discussions, I will outline pathways for an updated philosophy of the historiography of science.